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In a recently published dissertation, the
period following the deportation of the
Crimea Tatars in 1944 until the collapse
of the Soviet Union is described as fol-
lows, “…religious education was con-
fined to the family bounds. This had not
only affected the quality of education
but also the level of knowledge, which
remained low throughout the period.
Religious rites were observed only by
the older generations. Functions of reli-
gion were so limited that it could not
significantly influence the world out-
look of the rising generation.”1 This ob-
servation, reflecting the dominant opin-
ion of Ukrainian Muslims, may serve as a
point of departure for taking a closer
look at changes that occurred in the reproduction of Islamic knowledge
over the past decade in Ukraine. The implicit assumption underpinning
it seems to be that the social role of religion depends on the quality of
knowledge and the availability of formal institutions in the community.
Even though this assumption merits some further scrutiny because it is
not fully supported by actual practice it is true that younger genera-
tions of Ukrainian Muslims are not satisfied with the traditional religious
knowledge. Moreover, they do not view this knowledge as a proper tool
of reference for constructing their future. 
In spite of the absence of any institutionalized forms of Islam, such as
formal mosques or a professional clergy, during the post-WWII period,
religious life, as well as informal religious instruction, persisted within
communities of the Volga Tatars who were scattered mainly across the
mining region of Donbass, and within the compact Crimea Tatar
groups of the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions; as well as among the
Crimea Tatars living in exile, from which the majority returned in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Fieldwork data indicate that not a single
local community was without a small group of pious Muslims and a
mullah. The mullah would, as a rule, have a couple of assistants and dis-
ciples helping him in ritual performances. The pious few often includ-
ed relatives of the last generation of formally educated imams or grad-
uates of mektebs and random seekers of religious inspiration. The se-
nior mullah would either appoint a successor or the local community
would nominate a new one from the assistants. Communal religious
life was organized around the annual cycle of religious holidays and
the critical moments of the cycle of life. The former included major Is-
lamic holidays—qurban bairamy (id al-adha), uraza bairamy (id al-fitr),
and the mawlid, and, in the case of Crimea Tatars, Khidirles and Derviza
festivals celebrated at sacred places in Crimea.2 The main life cycle
events, which included such occasions as burials, obituary prayers,
birth (name-giving), circumcision, and marriage rites, were marked
with communal textual performances. A special social role was played
by pious women, known as abystai in the Kazan Tatar tradition, who
performed prayers on behalf of individuals, of which the most popular
was the recitation of the whole Quran, usually in exchange for some re-
muneration. 
In some localities, Friday prayers were held at private houses. Other
ritual performances included religious chants (of presumably Sufi ori-
gin)—ilahiye in the case of CrimeaTatars and munajat in the case of
Kazan Tatars—recited in native Turkic language mainly for the celebra-
tion of mawlid and Khidirles. The only formally acknowledged Islamic
place in the public domain in that period was the cemetery—usually a
section of common burial grounds, but sometimes having a separate
location—such as the case of the Sverdlovsk Muslim cemetery (Luhansk
region). 
Beyond the cycle of these main ritual
festivals and performances most Mus-
lims gradually absorbed the behav-
ioural codes of their non-Muslim envi-
ronment. The mullahs and the pious
were not able to insist on the full scope
of religious observance; Muslim tradi-
tions were losing ground and were in-
creasingly blended with common Sovi-
et customs resulting in a rather un-
orthodox synthesis. 
Continuous reproduction
How much knowledge did this type
of religiosity require and how was it
being reproduced? Some proficiency
in Arabic was required at least for two
important textual performances—reading the Quran and the writing
of amulets.3 The major performances involving Quranic texts—the
public recitation at various collective prayers—implied learning tajwid
(recitation), which could only be done at the hands of a teacher. Often,
the Arabic script was conveniently substituted by a transliteration in
Cyrillic. Consequently, many of second and third generation mullahs
were no longer capable of actually reading Arabic and could only per-
form their prayers from memorization. The skill to compose prayer was
also part of the expertise of a mullah or a pious woman. Proficiency in
the sacred language, Arabic, was perceived as the ability to recite cor-
rectly and according to the rules of tajwid, while focusing on the cere-
monial and symbolic value of particular fragments of the Quranic text
and not on its literal meaning. The scope of knowledge transferred
from one generation to another within the narrow circle of pious men
and women was contingent on the abilities and dedication of the older
generation of mullahs. In some localities the older generation man-
aged to transfer nearly fully their scope of knowledge and skills like, for
example, in the city of Kharkiv, where an elderly Bukhara-trained imam
managed to prepare three disciples, two of whom act as imams until
today. But some types of knowledge were limited in terms of repro-
duction by their very nature. The knowledge linked to the more magi-
cal aspects of religion—a valuable social asset for an individual who
was believed to have mastered it—was never meant to be open to any
lay Muslim. 
Only male mullahs acted as teachers for those seeking religious
knowledge. Pious women addressed familial and individual aspects of
religiosity, while mullahs the more formal and communal ones.
Women dealt with the spiritual, inner (and also native) religious tradi-
tions—such as the recitation of sacred chants. While the social context
in the Soviet times precluded an open profession of religious duties,
especially for younger age groups, the elderly pious females obtained
an important role in expressing the commitment to Islam by individual
lay members of the community. 
During the Soviet period access to religious expertise had become
more difficult while public space available for religious practices had
been significantly reduced. Even within these constraints religious
knowledge, as reproduced across two to three generations, remained
adequate, in terms of its content, to the spiritual and social purposes it
served; a condition that was not unlike that of many Muslims living
elsewhere. Therefore, the transformation the Islamic knowledge in that
area is best described as a functional reduction. The most important
outcome of it was not so much the demise of religious practices or
skills but the fact that Islam—just as Russian Orthodoxy—ceased to be
a universal belief system explaining the world. Consequently, its role as
a moral code was also curtailed. 
Identity & Culture
It is often believed that under the Soviet
regime in Ukraine—in particular after the
mass deportation of Crimea Tatars—Islam
ceased to be a communal project. New
research, however, reveals that the local
reproduction of religious knowledge has
continued to date. Moreover, it has shaped
to a great extent the religious fabric after
the breakdown of the Soviet Union.
Many younger Muslims consider this
traditional knowledge too inadequate to
address the challenges of today. They turn
increasingly to alternative knowledge
supplied by a variety of organizations and




ISIM-Newsletter-14-WEB-DEF  29-06-2004  11:06  Pagina 20
Identity & Culture
Post-Soviet experiences
Today the local production of knowl-
edge by and large follows the track
typical of localized traditional Islam.
With the re-establishment of Islamic in-
stitutions and hierarchies in the early
1990, those pious Muslims who had
been trained in informal settings of Is-
lamic learning came to the fore. They
filled the vacancies in the newly
emerging clergy which was now com-
prised of muftis, deputy muftis, and
imams. Some of the older religious
leaders, after being succeeded by
younger clerics, continued to be vocal
public speakers giving voice to the tra-
ditional local Islam. For instance, Nuri-
efendi, a former Crimean mufti now
runs a regular Islam Nuru page in the
Crimea Tatar Qirim newspaper and ap-
pears on the radio show Din ve Urf
Adetler (Religious and Local Customs).
Riza Fazil produced a series of books—
Diniy urf-adetlerimiz (Our Religious
Customs)—in cooperation with the
son of an imam who had been perse-
cuted in late 1920s.4
The local Islamic tradition is held in
esteem by Crimea Tatar politicians.
Being nationalists they consider what-
ever is “our own” has greater value than
any imported good. Thus they champi-
on “our traditional Crimean Islam.”
They hardly understand the limitations
caused by this notion of “traditional
Islam” when addressing the challenges
of modernity. 
With the advent of religious freedom
after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Muslim organizations and individuals
from Turkey, the Arab Middle East and
South Asia appeared on the Ukrainian
scene. It began with the arrival of
preachers of various schools of
thought. By the late 1990s a network of
NGOs, mosques and education facili-
ties with links to the Muslim heartlands
were established in those places with
sizable Muslim minorities as well as the
capital, Kiev. Much effort was put into opening education facilities
(madrasas and universities), offering both introductory and formal ad-
vanced courses. Religious education and guidance is now being pro-
vided by a variety of international and national organizations, includ-
ing the official Turkish Diyanet, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Endowment, ce-
maats of the Süleymaniya, followers of Fethullah Gülen, as well as the
Ikhwan Muslimun, Hizb al-Tahrir, Salafis, the Tabligh, and even
Habashis.5 Many young Crimeans are eagerly studying Islam as impart-
ed by these groups and often shifting from one to the other. In spite of
this seemingly large and varied supply of knowledge the more educat-
ed of them feel that their thirst for knowledge remains unquenched. As
yet, there is very little local production following the arrival of new
ideas. A unique attempt to involve Ukrainian Muslims in this process is
the establishment of an Islamic monthly by an Arab-sponsored NGO
network with ties to the Qatar based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-
Qaradawi. The group has also created an Internet resource page
(http://www.islamua.net) and produces occasionally short radio pro-
grams. 
It is difficult to judge to what extent new types of religious knowl-
edge and organizations impinge on the Muslim communities of
Ukraine. Is it possible to say that some of the Ukrainian Muslims are ac-
tually Ikhwani or Suleymanci? For instance, are the youth distributing
flyers of Hizb al-Tahrir in April 2003 and rallying against the US invasion
of Iraq, Tahriris in the sense that they have adopted the movement’s
ideology? Individual involvement and prefer-
ences continuously change. There is a high de-
mand for religious knowledge and much is cur-
rently being absorbed, but as yet the productive
incorporation into local Islam of new ideas and
concepts seems to be lacking. However, the very
idea that Islam involves more than ritual only is
spreading and may lay out the foundation for a
more comprehensive religious world outlook.
What that would be remains to be seen: “We are
trying to understand what is going on with our
community in Islamic terms; we are looking for
knowledge from all possible sources, but we do
not want to be taught the one thing as being op-
posed to the other,” as one young Crimean Mus-
lim put it.
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Notes
1. R. I. Khayali, Krymskotatarskiy narod v
usloviakh deportacii, 1944-1967 (Simferopol,
2000), 97.
2. Some Crimea Tatars used to come back from
exile annually to their native villages and
towns to celebrate Khidirles in 1970s
(festivals in the honour of the saint Khidr).
However, there is no such data for Derviza
(celebrated on the day of autumnal
equinox), which has apparently
discontinued in exile but has been re-
introduced after repatriation. 
3. The tradition of writing a Quranic verse on
piece of paper, folded in a triangular form
and quilted in a water-proof material to be
worn around the neck in a fashion similar to
a cross in Christian tradition—is widespread
among both Kazan and Crimea Tatars in
Ukraine. 
4. Buyurynyz Duagha: Dualar Kitaby, co-
authored by Abdulwait Sakhtara
(Simferopol, 2001); 101 Dua (Simferopol,
2002). 
5. For Habashis see A. Nizar Hamzeh and R.
Hrair Dekmejian, “A Sufi response to political
Islamism: al-Ahbash of Lebanon,” The
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